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ABSTRACT: This article rethinks Michel Foucault’s relation to religion by situating his en-
gagement with the ‘death of God’ in relation to his ongoing efforts to frame critical discourse 
in consistently immanent terms.  It argues that a certain, indirect ‘theological’ horizon is the 
paradoxical and problematic limit, for Foucault, of the possibility of a thoroughgoing imma-
nent discourse in his earlier work, due to the paradoxes of the death of long-duration of God 
(and ‘man’).  The relation of his work to religion thus emerges less as a productive question, 
for Foucault, than as a problem to be resolved if his critical project is to be viable.  The article 
argues that his later work is informed by a significant re-framing of his relation to religion, 
signalled in comments he makes at the end of his 1978 lecture, “What is Critique?” and per-
formed in his engagements with Christian mysticism, the ‘political spirituality’ of the Iranian 
revolution and early Christian practices of the self.  Foucault is shown to perform a complex 
openness to religion as ‘other,’ which negotiates the ‘religious problem’ haunting his early 
work, even as it must repeatedly risk undermining his project.  It is concluded that the relation 
to religion in Foucault’s work, less reflects resonance with aspects of a religious worldview, 
than it stages and clarifies the challenge of thinking otherwise immanently after the death of 
God.   
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In this article, I seek to rethink Michel Foucault’s relation to religion by situating his engage-
ment with the ‘death of God’ in relation to his ongoing efforts to frame critical discourse in 
consistently immanent terms.  It has been well-documented that the repeated struggle to re-
solve tensions in his formulation of an immanent notion of critical discourse, which would 
avoid appeal both to notions of a transcendent reality and to any transcendentalism, is a sig-
nificant factor in the evolution of Foucault’s thought at a series of points in his career, at least 
beginning from Derrida’s (in)famous critique of Histoire de la folie.1  However, to date, this dy-
                                                 
1 See, for example, Beatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical (Stan-
ford, California: Stanford University Press, 2002). See Jacques Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” 
in Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 36-76. 
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namic struggle has not been brought to bear upon analysis of his engagement with religion, 
although the ‘death of God’ leads directly to questions about the limits and possibilities of 
thinking immanence and transcendence (beyond an ontotheological metaphysics).  Bringing 
these two strands of Foucault’s work into dialogue suggests that his engagements with relig-
ion are, at least in part, paradoxically connected with the problem of constructing a purely 
immanent discourse.  Indeed, this article argues that a certain, indirect but apparently un-
avoidable, openness to religion is precisely a paradoxical and problematic condition, for Fou-
cault, of a consistently immanent discourse, capable of “thinking otherwise” (penser autre-
ment)2 after ‘the death of God.’  I will argue that Foucault’s key problem is how to negotiate 
this paradox so as to render his thought consistently immanent and critically effective.  Relig-
ion, it will be argued, repeatedly emerges as a problem in Foucault’s work, whose negotiation 
‘stages’ and ‘dramatises’ the challenge of realising a critically-effectively, immanent discourse, 
and foregrounds its dynamics, risks, and limits. 
Departing from recent efforts to establish how Foucault’s thought supports or at least 
productively intersects with religious and theological thought,3 this reading draws inspiration 
from the work of fellow ‘poststructuralist’ Jacques Derrida to uncover a more complex, prob-
lematised Foucauldian relation to religion, building upon parallels between their projects on 
the question of religion.4  For his part, Derrida proposes that religion repeatedly ‘returns’ as a 
question for contemporary philosophical discourse, in significant part, because it is undecid-
able whether the constitution of modern reason in opposition to religion led to rationalistic 
jettisoning of properly reasonable dimensions of thought as religious (perhaps among them, 
“philosophical faith,” Derrida argues).5  However, if the “return of religion” may constitute 
the return of reason to itself, we cannot, living on this side of the reason-religion disjunction, 
determine that this is the case (for the reason, which would decide so, by definition, excludes 
religion, or would have to rupture its own bounds to include it).  Rather, it is undecidable 
whether ‘religion,’ as it returns is, in fact, a name for that which exceeds reason as its truncated 
‘other.’  Or (to deploy Gianni Vattimo’s terms) it may be a name for a ‘singular’ or ‘positive’ 
                                                 
2 This remains a key problem, perhaps the key problem, for Foucault, even to the end of his life. See Michel 
Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality: Volume 2 (London and New York: Penguin, 1992), 8ff.  
3 It is beyond the scope of this article to examine this growing body of work. See my earlier, John 
McSweeney, “State of the Disciplines: Foucault and Theology,” Foucault Studies 2 (May 2005), 117-44.  There I 
argue that a tension in conceptualisation of Foucault’s relation to theology lies in the tendency to depend 
subtly on modernist paradigms of the theology-philosophy relation which tend to flatten out the relation to 
his work. 
4 The most sustained exploration of parallels between Derrida and Foucault on religion is found in Johannes 
Hoff, Spiritualität und Sprachverlust: Theologie nach Foucault und Derrida (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1999).  See 
also Arthur Bradley, Negative Theology and Modern French Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 
2004).  While Bradley, in particular, has important criticisms to make of Foucault’s “thought of the outside,” 
both these works are written primarily from a Derridean perspective, with rather less attention to Foucault’s 
relation to theology in its own right. Even then, they focus primarily on the question of the relation of nega-
tive theology to contemporary critical thought, rather than upon the broader question of ‘religion.’ 
5 For what follows, see Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of “Religion” at the Limits 
of Reason Alone,” in Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (eds.), Religion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 1-
78.  
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phenomenon (neither simply transcendent nor historical) upon which, paradoxically, univer-
sal reason depends.6  Or again, it may be a name for discourse, practices and apparatuses re-
lated to and dependent upon a notion of a transcendent reality.  A complex relation arises, in 
which contemporary critical thinkers are neither “priests” nor “enemies of religion,” but must 
interrogate religion’s returns in light of their constitutive commitment to “public-ness” and 
“republican democracy as a universalizable model.”7  At the same time, contemporary critical 
thought is unable to exclude the possibility—devastating (arguably) for the modern critical 
project as such—that the contemporary return of religion signals religion’s necessity (either as 
singular phenomenon or as relating to a transcendent realm), to the exercise of reason.8  
I will argue that, in a not dissimilar vein, religion repeatedly returns in Foucault’s work 
as a problem for critical thought.  This is, in part, because the death of God poses a similar 
problem for reason in relation to the question of immanence and transcendence.  Writing after 
the death of God, Foucault must grapple, no less than Derrida, with ‘undecidable’ alternatives.  
First, it may be that crucial possibilities of articulating transcendence(-within-immanence) may 
be bound up with religion, such that either engagement with religion—as its excess or ‘other’ 
excluded by modern thought—enables reason to ‘return to itself.’  Or, second, it may be that 
transcendence is finally thinkable as such only within the horizon of the singular contribution 
of religion to thought, or religious claims concerning the transcendent.   
To develop the distinctive Foucauldian form of such a relation to religion, this article 
will consider Foucault’s evolving approach to the death of God through the lens of three ‘mo-
ments’ of his work in the 1960s: his 1963 hommage to Georges Bataille, the final pages of Les 
mots et les choses (1966), and a brief comment on the death of God in the 1969, “What is an au-
thor?”9  It will then turn to a decisive (if unadvertised) transformation in Foucault’s conception 
of his relation to religion (and the limit), in the late 1970s, beyond the terms that had appeared 
                                                 
6 Gianni Vattimo has strongly articulated notion of the singularity of religion and the complex dependence of 
universal reason upon its singularity, using a notion of “positivity.” Religion as a “positive” phenomenon is 
neither the “finitude beyond which religious experience would have us ‘leap,’ so to speak (into God or tran-
scendence)” nor governed by a “historical determinism.”  Focussing on the incarnation, Vattimo argues that 
the event-like quality of religion is crucial to the very possibility of a philosophical thought which is not a 
simple description of its “times.”  See Gianni Vattimo, “The Trace of the Trace,” in Jacques Derrida and 
Gianni Vattimo (eds.), Religion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 79-94, especially 85, 94. 
7 Derrida, “Faith and Reason,” 7-8. 
8 While Derrida is not anti-religious, and embraces the need for the retrieval of philosophical faith in dia-
logue with religion and its correlate, a certain messianicity, he nonetheless is insistent on the difference be-
tween messianisms and messianicity, and the ultimate inadequacy of the former to the latter.  See, for exam-
ple, one of his final interviews, in which his distance from religions is clear: Jacques Derrida, “The Justice to 
Come” (interview with Lieven De Cauter, 2004), accessed online at 
http://archive.indymedia.be/uploads/derrida_en.pdf on 21/05/2012.  Equally, arguments such as Vattimo’s 
about the dependence of reason upon the “positivity” or singularity or religion, raises significant problems 
for the universality of a critical discourse.  Specifically, Vattimo argues that the incarnation is the ‘event’ 
necessary to reveal the very possibility of a critical thought. 
9 Michel Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,” in Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984, Volume 2: 
Aesthetics, edited by James D. Faubian (London and New York: Penguin, 2000), 69-87; Michel Foucault, The 
Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences: (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 1989); 
Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?, in Essential Works, Volume 2, 205-22, especially 209. 
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to be imposed by the death of God.  Finally, it will consider three instances of this transformed 
relation in Foucault’s later work.   
 
Transgression and the Death of God 
The question of the death of God is explicitly linked to that of immanence in “A Preface to 
Transgression,” Foucault’s 1963 hommage to Georges Bataille.  Transgression is transgression 
against an absent God (distinction is not made between religious and metaphysical senses of 
the term, both being evoked).  Hence, transgression does not involve a simple “theological 
anger,” to borrow Jeremy Carrette’s succinct phrase.10  Instead, even as transgression opens 
onto “the night where God is absent, and where all of our actions are addressed to this ab-
sence in profanation” such profanation “at once identifies it, dissipates it, exhausts itself in it, 
and restores it to the empty purity of its transgression.”11  That is, transgression characteristi-
cally begins from an act, which affirms God’s absence by seeking to provoke his promised an-
ger (or activate the limits of being), against profanation.  However, the movement of trans-
gression is ultimately toward a recognition that God has never existed (both the Christian God 
and metaphysical ideals of being).  As such, it leads to the immanent affirmation of the lim-
ited, divided being of human beings as that which exists and which is deserving of affirma-
tion.  As Foucault puts it: “Transgression contains nothing negative.”  It is at a decisive re-
move from Hegelian negation and its recuperations (or indeed, from a negative theology 
which would negate in order to affirm a more profound reality).12  Instead, it exhausts itself in 
affirming the limit as finite, by effacing it as boundary with a realm of otherness.  The limit is 
affirmed as internal to finite being rather than a limit with that which lies beyond finite being: 
transgression, “affirms limited being... Perhaps it is simply an affirmation of division... [of] the 
existence of difference.”13  
This formulation suggests that transgression might serve as a model of an immanent 
act of freedom, that is, as an act whose affirmations (of “finite” difference) involve no re-
inscription of a transcendent or transcendental order.  Yet, the affirmation involved remains 
impossibly tied—as Foucault acknowledges14—to the transgressive experience of divine ab-
sence.  Of course, the death of God is an “event”—a specific historical shift, provoked by a 
myriad of factors—in the Western commitment to a transcendently-ordered world, what Fou-
cault terms a world shaped by the “limit of the Limitless.”  However, it is, Foucault argues, no 
mere past event, but “continues indefinitely tracing its great skeletal outline.”15  Undoubtedly, 
this is, in part, due to the density of the experience of the “limit of the Limitless” and the long 
reign of the latter, culturally and intellectually—the death of God could not have been an 
event of short duration.  But more profoundly, the reason lies in the very nature of the death 
                                                 
10 Jeremy Carrette, Foucault and Religion: Spiritual Corporality and Political Spirituality (London and New York: 
Routledge 2000), 74. 
11 Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,” 70. 
12 Ibid., 74. 
13 Ibid., 74. 
14 Ibid., 71: “Bataille was perfectly conscious of the possibilities of thought that could be released by this 
death, and of the impossibilities to which it could entangle thought.” 
15 Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,” 71 
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of this order, or “ordo” (as Heidegger puts it),16 as revealed by the dynamics of transgression 
and specifically its mode of affirming finite difference.   
Transgression cannot open onto an ‘other’ realm of being without reinscribing a ver-
sion of the ‘ordo’ it would deny; and it must therefore exhaust itself in affirming the limit.  As 
such, its drama must be perpetually repeated: it cannot decisively move beyond the Christian-
metaphysical ‘ordo,’ but must repeatedly affirm finite difference in uncovering once more, in 
some new existentially-significant fashion, the non-existence of God.  Transgression inscribes 
the drama of the death of God as a new “structure” of experience.17  Moreover, it is not only 
that transgression must as it were, begin again with each of its instances.  In addition, as Fou-
cault’s ‘lightening-in-the-night’ metaphor of the relation of transgression and the limit makes 
clear, this starting point profoundly conditions what may be affirmed of the finite limits of 
human existence.  If transgression is ultimately secondary to the limit which it affirms (the 
flash of lightening loses itself in that to which it gives clarity) and if it “owes the dark the stark 
clarity of its manifestation, its harrowing and poised singularity” (i.e. if transgression is only 
so forceful and significant an act because it touches upon some obscured dimension of human 
existence), it nonetheless “gives a dense and black intensity to the night it denies.”18  That is to 
say, the specific light cast upon it by the concern to transgress God largely circumscribes what 
is revealed and affirmed of the finite limit.  For instance, sexual transgression certainly reveals 
the finite limit constituted in human experience by sexuality, but its focus is upon taboo, ex-
cess, anxiety and so on, because this limit is revealed in the transgression of the strictures both 
of religious sexual morality and religious ideals concerning what sexuality signifies.  When 
Carrette regrets that Foucault never moves, in his thought about sexual transgression, beyond 
models of “isolation, distrust, and anxiety,”19 he thus arguably encounters, not a failure of will, 
on Foucault’s part, to engage with a more holistic conception of sexuality, but precisely the 
limit of transgression as precisely transgression of the absent God.20 
This analysis also offers a fresh perspective on Carrette’s claim that Foucault’s work in 
this period involves a “religious question.”21  In the first instance, the relation between trans-
gression and limit underscores how Foucault could, as Carrette demonstrates, utilise trans-
gression of religious conceptions of the body and sexuality to enrich, contest, and destabilise 
their modern post-religious counterparts.  For, if the specificity of transgression restricts the 
ways in which finite human limits are experienced, it also casts a particular light upon them.  
                                                 
16 Martin Heidegger, “Nietzsche’s Word: ‘God is Dead’,” in Martin Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track, edited 
and translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 164-5. 
17 Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,” 70: “the speech given to sexuality is contemporaneous in both time 
and structure, with that through which we announced to ourselves that God is dead.” 
18 Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,” 69-70.  See also, 73: “The limit and transgression depend on each 
other for whatever density of being they possess: a limit could not exist if it were absolutely uncrossable and, 
reciprocally, transgression would be pointless if merely crossed a limit composed of illusions and shadows.” 
19 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, 83. 
20 Of course, in principle, transgression (as a general term) need not be transgression of the absent God, with 
its peculiar dynamics. However, the question and ultimately the problem for Foucault concerns how to con-
ceive of transgression in different terms, against the density of the experience of the death of God and the 
form it prescribes for transgression. 
21 Carrette, Foucault and Religion, 3. 
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And religious experience, as Derrida has been seen to assert, may well embody dimensions of 
human experience rejected as religious by the Enlightenment.  If the religious death of God 
has largely occurred in modern thought, Foucault himself later makes clear, in The Order of 
Things, that philosophy from Kant, through Hegel and Marx, remains bound to that death by 
the figure of man.  As such, religious transgression has the capacity to disrupt a thought, 
which claims to have dispensed with the religious God, but remains circumscribed by the sub-
tle ‘ordo’ constituted around the figure of ‘man.’  However, this essentially philosophical act 
of destabilisation and complication,22 is already haunted by a further implicit question: if 
transgression is bound to repeat the drama of the death of God—experienced, by Foucault and 
Bataille, as the singular horizon and “structure” of contemporary thought—and if transgres-
sion of the absent God delimits what may be affirmed of finite being, is it possible to think 
immanence only within an indirect (and, strictly, non-existent) ‘theological’ horizon?23 (Even if 
transgression should have concluded that God never existed, what may be affirmed of imma-
nence is circumscribed by that conception of God, as the object of transgression.)  And if im-
manence is thinkable only in a restricted manner, within such a singularly delimited horizon, 
is the possibility of a thoroughgoing immanent discourse fatally undermined? 
How to assess the extent to which such a theological horizon poses a ‘religious ques-
tion’ for Foucault and for immanent discourse? First, it should be noted that any answer to this 
question must recognise that the notion of ‘God,’ within the horizon of the death of God, as 
Derrida indicates in somewhat different terms, itself involves an undecidable religious ques-
tion: that is, in what sense (to put it naively) does God signify the God of Christianity or Being, 
and its ideals, within metaphysics?  However, this complicating question is not of key signifi-
cance in relation to Foucault.  For, however the question is answered, the theological horizon 
of transgressive affirmation of finite difference does not appear to imply any kind of ‘negative 
theology,’ because, in transgression, finite human being is affirmed in its own right, not just as 
a sublation of the theological, however it might be defined.24  The theological horizon does not 
                                                 
22 See Jeremy Carrette, “Prologue to a Confession of the Flesh,” in Michel Foucault, Religion and Culture, ed-
ited by Jeremy R. Carrette (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), 20-23.  Carrette clarifies that the ‘post-
religious’ question of Foucault’s thought, as it engages with Bataille, is not a religious question in the tradi-
tional sense. See also Michael Mahon, Foucault’s Nietzschean Genealogy: Truth, Power and the Subject. SUNY 
Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy (New York: State University Press of New York, 1992), 63-
65.  Mahon argues that Foucault’s Bataille is one who restores to discourse the possibility of the “sacred.”  
However, the ‘sacred’ refers primarily to that which resists assimilation to bourgeois and everyday reality, 
that which is revealed in moments of shock when everyday categories temporarily crumble.  It is unclear 
whether the term bears any religious connotation. 
23 Although the death of God is both metaphysical and religious, the question remains as to whether one or 
other is primary.  Is the death of God primarily metaphysical and religion thereby merely stripped of an 
inessential metaphysical form?  Or is religion (or a specific religion) rooted in a singular event, or does it 
constitute a singularity, that in Vattimo’s terms is not simply historical but an irruptive event that makes key 
dimensions of philosophical thought (of the event, of a transcendence of and within history) possible.  Inso-
far as religious transgression proves at least an important dimension of transgression, then, credence is given 
to the latter notion of a religious singularity, which conditions all thought.  
24 Foucault’s notion of negative theology is useful here.  See Foucault, “The Thought of the Outside,” Essen-
tial Works, Volume 2, 150: although negative theology “involves going ‘outside of oneself,’ this is done ulti-
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constitutively condition the affirmation as such: transgressive affirmation is not directly condi-
tioned by whether God is the Christian God or refers to the pinnacle of Being.  Rather, what 
can be affirmed is circumscribed by the singularity or positivity of God—the singular set of ideas, 
events, etc. associated with God, which cannot be translated into universal terms—(again) 
however God is defined.25  It is the circumscription of the possible scope of affirmation that 
raises the question of whether an immanent transgressive discourse can bear on all aspects of 
human existence, or is limited to certain specific elements, defined by the singularity of God.  
As a consequence, the undecidability of the term ‘God’ is largely irrelevant for Foucault. 
Readers of Foucault, who accept a certain persisting vitality of ‘religion beyond relig-
ion’ (with all of the undecidability that conditions that notion) might find, in Foucault’s grap-
pling with this strangely indirect ‘theological’ horizon, the delineation of a post-religious space, 
which contaminates and destabilises traditional religious spaces.  However, the preceding 
analysis suggests that this ‘religious question’—insofar as it comes into focus as a question—
becomes, for Foucault’s thought, an acute difficulty that appears to impose a limit upon the 
possibility of entering upon an unfettered immanent discourse, and thus threatens to under-
mine it.  Put differently, from the perspective of the question of religion, this ‘religious problem’ 
can potentially be thought of as a productive problem which opens new spaces of religious 
thinking, while from Foucault’s perspective it is, or rather becomes, in the repetition of trans-
gression, a problem to be resolved, if his critical project is to endure.  Thus, in “A Preface to 
Transgression,” the preceding questions amount only to a tension, but by The Order of Things 
(1966), it has become a problem which that work seeks to solve in its final pages. 
 
Beyond Transgression? The Death of God and Man 
Foucault frames his history of the emergence and death of man, and the return of language, in 
The Order of Things, in terms of the Nietzschean notion of the death of God and the last man, 
arguing that:  
 
the last man is at the same time older and younger than the death of God; since he has killed 
God, it is he himself who must answer for his own finitude; but since it is the death of God 
that he speaks, thinks, and exists, his murder is itself doomed to die.26  
 
Evidently, Foucault is here concerned primarily with Nietzsche’s last man, his own modern 
subject.  However, his analysis applies no less cogently to the transgressive subject of “A Pref-
ace to Transgression.”  With clear echoes of the preceding analysis, the text suggests that the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
mately in order to find oneself, to wrap and gather oneself in the dazzling interiority of a thought that is 
rightfully Being and Speech, in other words, Discourse, even if it is the silence beyond all language and the 
nothingness beyond all being.” 
25 As Vattimo, highlights a singular dimension of Christianity is the Incarnation.  Following Foucault, one 
might say that ‘confession of the flesh’ is another. Metaphysics and the God of metaphysics would appear to 
be universalizable, but the dependence upon certain ideals of being or a certain transcendent(al) speculation 
concerning the hierarchy of being arguably renders them highly ‘singular’—a positive construct, which fun-
damentally shapes thought, but whose appeals to transcendent being or the transcendentals of being breach 
the limits of immanence. 
26 Foucault, The Order of Things, 420. 
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death of God, indeed, the murder of God, involves the human affirmation of human finitude 
on its own terms.  Moreover, no less than in the case of transgression, what the last man 
“speaks, thinks and exists” in affirming his finitude, is the “death of God,” such that the affir-
mation of finitude is limited and indirect.  The text also highlights—if in slightly different 
terms—how, under repetition, the act of killing God ultimately undermines its own efficacy.  
At best, then, transgression is implicitly contextualised as having constituted a mode of resis-
tance to the dominant modern paradigm of subjective experience, within an era that is now 
passing.  Transgression, one might say, with its language of “sovereignty” and “inner experi-
ence” belongs to the era of man.27  
That Foucault intends that the potential ‘religious problem’ posed by transgression 
should end with this contextualisation, is suggested by his explicit commitment to the 
Nietzschean notion that after the death of God the space remains “empty”: ‘man’ is not the 
sublation of the dead God (by contrast with Hegel’s notion that dialectically developing rea-
son sublates God and Feuerbach’s notion that man develops with the dismissal of the illusion 
of God).28  And indeed, this point follows from the previous quotation: affirmation of human 
finitude in the death of God is external to that death as such, and if man is doomed to disap-
pear, it is not because man sublates God and the death of the latter implies the death of the 
former, but that the last man is fundamentally circumscribed by his inability to think imma-
nence beyond the indirect self-affirmation constituted by murdering God—an affirmation 
which loses its force as the idea of God’s death takes hold, so that the death of God eventually 
implies the death of man.29  Nevertheless, if Foucault would consign transgression and the 
‘religious problem’ it poses to the passing era of man, the impossibility of transgression and 
this ‘religious problem’ are not so easily overcome.   
One of the striking features of Foucault’s announcement of the death of man in The Or-
der of Things is that he ultimately does not pronounce his death as such, only its imminent pos-
sibility:  
 
man is an invention of recent date.  And one perhaps nearing its end.  If those arrangements 
were to disappear [that gave rise to man]... then one certainly wager that man would be 
erased, like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea.30 
 
Again, “we believe that something new is about to begin, something we glimpse only as a thin 
line low on the horizon.”31  What is the significance of this caution before announcing the 
                                                 
27 Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression,” 71. 
28 Foucault, “Philosophy and the Death of God,” in Foucault, Religion and Culture, 85. 
29 The English translation of Les mots et les choses appears to lend support to the argument that Foucault’s 
pronouncement of the death of the subject constitutes a kind of negative theology, when it states that “the 
death of God and the last man are engaged in a contest with more round” (la mort de Dieu et le dernier homme 
ont partie liée”).  The phrase is, however, better translated as “the death of God and the last man go hand in 
glove.” This alternative translation points more restrictedly to the idea that the death of man follows upon 
the death of God, precisely for the reasons just discussed.  Foucault, The Order of Things, 420; Michel 
Foucault, Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), 396. 
30 Foucault, The Order of Things, 422. 
31 Ibid., 419. 
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death of man?  While Foucault might be supposed merely to be exploiting the force of dra-
matic announcement, the deeper answer lies once more with the problem of the long shadow 
of the death of God and how to think immanently beyond and independently of it.  Foucault’s 
hesitation is paralleled by a specific gloss that he offers on his extension of the Nietzschean 
death of God to man: his anticipation of the likely death of man in the phrase: “new gods, the 
same gods are swelling the future ocean.”32  For although it recalls Heidegger’s critique, that 
Nietzsche’s Übermensch remains entangled in the nihilism of Western metaphysics, it equally 
constitutes a critique of Heidegger’s alternative notion that today we are in a “needy time” 
where being has withdrawn and hope lies in its return (the return of the gods).33  Already, in 
1966, Foucault elsewhere attempts to deploy the notion of the Übermensch, while disburdening 
himself of its Nietzschean content, by suggesting the overman “will be whoever can overcome 
the absence of God and the absence of man in the same gesture of overtaking.”34  Later, he will 
draw a distinction between a Nietzschean will to knowledge, which is to be embraced (and 
“diagnoses the state of thought...  studying the space in which thought unfolds, as well as the 
conditions of that thought, and the mode of its constitution”)35 and a Nietzschean will to 
power to be avoided.36  As such, Foucault clearly accepts Heidegger’s view that Nietzsche’s 
‘overman’ remains entangled with the last man and the death of God, and does not support 
pursuit of an immanent philosophical discourse.  At the same time, Foucault’s reference to 
“new gods, the same gods” robs Heidegger’s thought of its notion of a decisive, compelling 
return of being to come, suggesting that the new gods can only largely be the same gods, albeit 
offering some differing configuration and possibilities of being.  Moreover, the phrase sug-
gests that if the gods are present to both the present and the future, they are not only the locus 
of a return of being, but form part of the order of things.  That is to say, for Foucault, there can 
only be mundane, but real possibilities of historical change, with their continuities, disconti-
nuities, and ambiguities—however dramatic such shifts (of episteme) may appear to be.37  
                                                 
32 Ibid., 420, 
33 See Martin Heidegger, “Hölderin and the Essence of Poetry,” in Existence and Being (South Bend, Indiana: 
Regnery/Gateway, 1979), 289; Martin Heidegger, “Remembrance of the Poet,” in Existence and Being, 244-259, 
264-265.  The notion of the “future Ocean” recalls Nietzsche’s “madman,” who wonder how we have been 
able to kill God, “But how did we do this? How were we able to drink up the sea?” (Nietzsche, The Gay Sci-
ence, 120 (section 125)).  Through this phrase, Foucault subtly suggests that he does not embrace Heidegger’s 
wider philosophical perspective, but his critique of Nietzsche as a modification of the latter’s viewpoint. 
34 Foucault, “Philosophy and the Death of God,” 86. 
35 Ibid. This quote is in fact from 1966, but here Foucault distinguishes between a Nietzschean will to knowl-
edge and a Heideggerian opening of new paths in philosophy. 
36 See Foucault, “Structuralism and Poststructuralism,” Essential Works, Volume 2, 446.  
37 Although Foucault argues for a radical break between epistemes at the level of the structuring of knowl-
edge, he does allow for significant continuity of elements and forces at play.  For example, he argues that the 
classical episteme is characterised by a binary system of pure representation, in which the signifier is con-
ceived of as directly and perfectly representing the signified, within the distribution of representations con-
stituted by “mathesis” and the “table.”  This epistemic structure eliminates the ternary relation between 
signifier, signified, and conjunction (the “being of language”) that had characterised Western thought prior 
to the classical era.  However, this shift introduces a tension that leads to a third element reappearing in the 
late eighteenth century in the form of an intermediary structure (that of labour within analysis of wealth, the 
organism within natural history, system of inflection within the study of language) necessary to constituting 
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In other words, Foucault refuses to adopt either Nietzsche’s or Heidegger’s proposals 
for a mode of thought and practice thought after the death of God and the last man, because 
each threatens to reinscribe a subtle new “ordo” to replace the Christian one coming to an end 
(the will to power as transvaluing all values, the gods to come as constituting a horizon of 
meaning).  As has been seen, however, Foucault equally rules out the notion that affirmation 
of finite, immanent difference can occur, in an unqualified fashion, within the horizon of the 
death of God.  Hence, with these options excluded, the solution remaining to him is performa-
tive.  He does not seek to overcome the death of God as such, entangling himself in the prob-
lems of attempting to ‘overcome’ God or metaphysical thinking.  Neither does he simply re-
main within the horizon of the death of God, but dynamically situates his work within an im-
minent movement beyond it.  By explicitly holding, moreover, that this movement is merely a 
possibility that appears to be emerging, however probable is its occurrence, he refuses to step 
outside the confines of the historical situation to which he finds himself immanent.  Rather, 
insofar as he is correct that we are on the cusp of a decisive epistemic shift, then, his work is 
not only consistently immanent (it is immanent to an actually existing situation), but effective 
in signalling and thus contributing to the anticipated transition.38  Foucault’s is a subtle per-
formance, which would escape the impossibilities of transgression and the death of God by 
carefully delineating what it is possible to say consistently regarding the latter, within its 
shadow.   
No less than the drama of transgression, however, such performance loses coherence in 
its repetition, for its power comes precisely from reflecting and effecting this transition.  The 
anticipated event must occur; “new thought” must become possible and be actualised.39  As 
Foucault will say in 1969, in relation to the author, it is:  
 
…not enough to keep repeating that God and man have died a common death.  Instead we 
must map the space left empty by the death of the author, follow the distribution of gaps 
and breaches, and watch for the openings this disappearance uncovers.40  
 
And to the extent that thought remains trapped within this moment of emergent change, the 
problematic relation to religion, arising from transgression, tends to be reinscribed.  As seen, 
transgression could only affirm of finite being that upon which transgression of the absent 
God cast light.  And while constituting a genuine and potentially liberating affirmation of hu-
man finitude, the restriction of thought to the repetition of this specific affirmation not only 
offered diminishing returns, but raised the question whether the absent God thus constitutes a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the relation between signifier and signified.  Tension now emerges in relation to the sustainability of the 
classical conception of representation itself.  The modern episteme transposes this tension into a new struc-
ture, constituting ‘labour,’ the ‘organism’ and ‘language’ as quasi-transcendentals, intersecting as planes of a 
“trihedron” that simultaneously define the condition of possibility of knowledge and its object.  In turn, the 
risk to the unity of knowledge, within this complex framework, will see the emergence of the figure of man 
as the single object and subject of these spheres of knowledge.  See Foucault, Les mots et les choses, 57-58, 
229ff, 249; Foucault, The Order of Things, 46-47, 236ff, 257; 
38 Even if he is incorrect, his thought remains consistent by virtue of its intentional lack of certainty. 
39 “New thought” is how Foucault describes the thought of Gilles Deleuze in this period.   
40 See Foucault, “What is an Author?,” 209. (translation slightly modified.) 
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condition of immanent discourse and a limit upon its scope.  Similarly, Foucault’s perform-
ance in The Order of Things is genuinely immanent to a specific moment of the death of God and 
thus affirms the very possibility of an immanent discourse beyond the long death of God (and 
man).  Yet to the extent that thought is restricted, over time, to that single kind of immanent 
act, the question arises as to whether the thought of immanence is after all decisively circum-
scribed by the horizon of the death of God.  Again the dependence is indirect and negative, 
and even more abstractly formal—transgression of God has been displaced by the question of 
how to think the disappearance of God and man—God no longer appearing to constitute even 
a compelling object of transgression.  The logic is essentially the same, however—for the death 
of God appears to place a limit upon the scope of immanent affirmation and thus upon the 
possibility of a thoroughgoing immanent discourse. 
 
To Have Done With the Death of God 
How then does Foucault seek to avoid merely “repeating that God and man have died a 
common death”?  The answer would appear to be provided by his analysis of power into the 
1970s, which pursues a thoroughly immanent exploration and articulation of power, beyond it 
would seem the ‘reach’ of both deaths.  However, if this is so, then, the crisis of Foucault’s 
thought in the mid-1970s can equally be taken to constitute the limit of this attempt to have 
done with the death of God and man.  This crisis is anticipated in the opening remarks to his 
1976 course at the Collège de France, “Society Must be Defended.”  There, Foucault portrays his 
work as caught between two difficulties: on the one hand, he fears that his research into the 
operation of power—tactically fragmentary against the unity of hegemonic discourses of 
power—is “making no progress, and it’s all leading nowhere.  It’s all repetitive, and it doesn’t 
add up… perhaps we’re not saying anything at all.”41  Moreover, whatever advances are made 
risk being immediately “recoded, recolonized” by power.42  On the other hand, he recognises 
that:  
 
…if we try to protect the fragments we have dug up, don’t we run the risk of building, with 
our own hands a unitary discourse?  That is what we are being invited to do, that is the trap 
that being set for us by all those say, “It’s all very well, but where does it get us?43  
 
In a subtle iteration of the dynamics of his earlier thought, Foucault is faced, once more, with 
the alternatives of an act (his fragmentary researches), which bears an immanent power of cri-
tique of the dominant order, but which cannot define progress beyond that order, without 
rupturing the constitutive limits of that act (its specificity, local nature)—it can only be re-
peated, even as its repetition over time tends to diminish its efficacy—and an act which rein-
scribes order.  Moreover, this latter danger arguably has roots in Foucault’s own practice: as 
has been variously argued, the very attempt to describe the operations of power immanently 
down to its “microphysics” and insinuations into the “capillaries” of society tends toward a 
                                                 
41 Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, edited by Mauro Ber-
tani and Alessandro Fontana, translated by David Macey (London and New York: Allen Lane, 2003), 4. 
42 Ibid., 11. 
43 Ibid., 11. 
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subtle new transcendentalism, best exemplified by the relational grid of analysis of power 
emerging in The Will to Knowledge.44  As ubiquitous, power becomes, in effect, the condition-
ing, structuring quasi-transcendental truth of human experience.45  And by offering ever finer 
articulations of power,46 Foucault inadvertently makes the socio-political and subjective spaces 
thus delineated more readily identifiable and more easily subject to power.47  To this extent, 
arguably—and a far more extensive analysis of this period is warranted, but beyond the scope 
of this article—the attempt to have done with the death of God and man in favour of a thor-
oughgoing immanent discourse, thus not only sees a repetition of the problematic dynamics 
shared both by the act of transgression and Foucault’s subsequent ‘performative’ solution to 
the paradoxes of the death of God.  It additionally tends to reinscribes a problematic transcen-
dental trace of the Christian “ordo” precisely when it attempts to ‘overcome’ definitively the 
death of God and man.   
 
Later Foucault: A Significant Transformation 
I wish to argue that Foucault breaks free from such repetition of the peculiar dynamics of im-
manent thought in the shadow of the death of God via a transformation of his relation to the 
limit, signalled in comments he makes during the discussion that immediately followed his 
1978 lecture, “What is Critique?”48  This transformation is one among several in Foucault’s 
work in the late 1970s, and like many of them remains largely subterranean in his writings, 
lectures, and interviews in this period, but can nonetheless be discerned in its affects upon his 
later analyses.  Clarifying what he meant in his lecture by the notion of “the will not to gov-
erned,” he states,  
 
I was not referring to something that would be a fundamental anarchism, that would be like 
an originary freedom, absolutely and wholeheartedly resistant to any governmentalization.  
I did not say it, but this does not mean that I absolutely exclude it.49  
 
                                                 
44 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 (London: Penguin, 1990), 92-95. 
45 Even if his researches are always local and specific, the claim that power is ubiquitous tends to undermine 
critical immanent discourse.  Later, Foucault will claim that the infinite reach of power was never meant to 
imply infinite control, but, in this period, in the late 1970s, he, in fact, has few resources to exploit this dis-
tinction effectively.  
46 Gilles Deleuze, “On the New Philosophers (Plus a More General Problem),” in Deleuze, Two Regimes of 
Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995 (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), 139.  Gilles Deleuze described his 
and Foucault’s work in this period, as “trying to create concepts with fine articulations, extremely differenti-
ated concepts, to escape gross dualisms” and to generate “creative functions,” which would no longer ap-
peal to an “empty and vain subject,” but be capable of engaging and resisting the full complexity of the func-
tioning of power. 
47 For an example of how Foucault’s analyses of power have been used to better extend the reach of power, 
see Barbara Townley, “Foucault, Power/Knowledge and its relevance for HRM,” Academy of Management 
Review 18 (1993): 518-545. 
48 Michel Foucault, “What is Critique?,” in The Politics of Truth, edited by Sylvère Lotringer and L. Hochroth 
(New York: Semiotext(e), 1997), 23-82. 
49 Ibid., 72. 
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Judith Butler has highlighted the complex “staging” involved in these apparently incidental 
comments.50  The paradoxes of Foucault’s “I did not say it”—a denial of speaking that is itself 
not only speech, but a subtle means of saying, in its denial, what one claims not to have said—
allow him to posit the possibility that freedom requires an originary freedom only in with-
drawal from any commitment to such a position.  In so doing, he does not crudely embrace a 
notion, which would previously have been anathema to his thought, Butler argues, but 
“draw[s] from the term he refuses,” “invoking it so that we might relive its resonances, and 
know its power,” such that in the process “a nearly collapsible critical distance is performed 
for us.”  In other words, Foucault finds a way to allow his thought be affected by a notion of 
freedom which, however problematic he might judge it to be, has been central to the Western 
effort to articulate and defend freedom, and thus may well ‘hold’ certain vital intuitions and 
insights concerning freedom.  Moreover, he opens a space between his own discourse of free-
dom and this (for him) impossible, but richly resonant notion, which enables him to push be-
yond the former’s terms, preoccupations and limits and to risk engaging radically ‘other’ 
ideas.  At the same time, such a space always threatens to collapse because the subtleties of the 
staging may break down, due either to a naively excessive embrace of the impossibly ‘other’ 
notion, or a failure to truly stage its im/possibility.  Crucially, for Butler, Foucault thus exer-
cises a political freedom in relation to his own thought: he refuses the subtle subjugation (to an 
order that incorporates resistance within its hegemony), which would require him to remain, 
as a radical intellectual, firmly on the side of an immanent freedom and to reject ‘originary 
freedom.’  It thus signals, for her, the “virtue” of the later Foucault’s thought: its willingness to 
place itself in question, to refuse those limits, subtle or otherwise, which it might place or al-
low be placed upon it.   
Butler’s broader concern is to demonstrate how Foucault’s work can be aligned with a 
certain kind of progressive politics, that his critique is not merely a form of “fault-finding,” but 
continually opens itself to the possibility of what is, on the face of it, anathema to it.  And this 
concern leads to a subtle emphasis upon the relation (or relation-in-difference) between Fou-
cault’s thought and that which is other than it.  Stepping back from these concerns, and paying 
attention to the crisis of thought, through which Foucault was struggling in that period, makes 
it possible to detect in these comments the beginning of a more basic rethinking, on Foucault’s 
part, of his relation to the limit and, in turn, of his relation to religion—indeed, a rethinking of 
his relation to the limit that is ultimately exemplified by his relation to religion.   
As David Macey points out, a deep intellectual crisis crystallises in 1977, for Foucault, 
following the publication of Baudrillard’s Forget Foucault, or, rather more precisely, in light of 
the lack of support from colleagues against Baudrillard’s attack.51  And although Foucault’s 
initial (relative) silence does not last long, he struggles to reframe his thought over the next 
                                                 
50 For what follows, see Judith Butler, “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” accessed at 
http://eipcp.net/transversal/0806/butler/en, on 21/05/2012.  Originally published in David Ingram (ed.), The 
Political: Readings in Continental Philosophy (London: Basil Blackwell, 2002), 212-227. 
51 David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault (New York: Vintage, 1994), 360; Jean Baudrillard, Forget Foucault, 
translated by Phil Beitchman, Lisa Hildreth and Mark Polizzoti (New York: Semiotext(e), 1987). 
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several years: a brief rapprochement with the nouveaux philosophes52 gives way to his analyses 
of biopower, which in turn is displaced by a focus on pastoral power and governmentality, 
then, specifically, by liberalism, (not to mention his writings on Iran) before the ‘thinness’ of 
the freedom of the liberal homo economicus drives Foucault back to ancient Christian sources in 
search of more significant resources for a contemporary notion of critical subjectivity.53  Taken 
seriously, Foucault’s intellectual crisis means that he cannot engage with radically ‘other’ pos-
sibilities of thought, such as the potential necessity of an ‘originary will’ to the exercise of free-
dom, always already safely in the mode of withdrawing from them, confident that his basic 
framework of thought is viable before their challenge.  There is a vulnerability beneath the 
sophisticated performance of his comments at the end of “What is Critique?” (One need only 
consider the distance Foucault must travel, what he must put at risk, even to broach the possi-
bility that after all, the individual may need to possess an originary will, constituted beyond 
historical-political forces, to be able truly to exercise freedom.)  He is confronted here, and 
later when he is struggling to elaborate a viable notion of subjectivity, with the real prospect 
that his work is “leading nowhere” and that such ‘other’ notions are necessary for a contem-
porary thought adequate to human experience.  Insofar as he can no longer be certain that his 
project is capable of articulating and supporting human freedom, then, the question about an 
originary will is genuinely posed, and the possibility faced of an affirmative answer that 
would radically undermine his project.  The “staging” identified by Butler is at play, but 
across greater discontinuities and with greater stakes. 
What is the ultimate significance of these greater discontinuities and stakes?  Foucault 
risks broaching a possibility of thought, which, were he ultimately to embrace it, would fatally 
rupture and undermine his critical project.  He certainly seeks to use this possibility, as it 
were, as a beacon to light the space beyond the current limits of his thought, drawing him be-
yond his conceptual apparatus and resources, the traditions to which he belongs, his own pas-
sions, preoccupations, and biases.  However, the crucial point is that this is a movement that 
he cannot delimit, but which he must embrace even if it should take him beyond an impossible 
limit for his thought.  And to the extent that he risks this movement without reserve, it has the 
potential to lead him to think otherwise maximally.  That is to say, if it has not shied away from 
the demands of thought (in this case for an adequate ground of freedom) even to the point of 
rupturing the immanent framework of his thought, and if it survives this test, Foucault’s 
thought will have been brought to the limit of immanent discourse (and brought immanent 
discourse to its limits), opening itself to maximal change.    
Such a practice differs from the transgressive use of religious ideas and practices to en-
rich, complicate, and destabilise modern post-religious thought, because the former presup-
poses that God has never existed—that religious experience, for instance, is empty as such.  
The ‘religious question,’ which his earlier work faces, constitutes an ultimately problematic 
trace of dependence upon the God who has never existed, in spite of its conception of religion.  
                                                 
52 See, for example, Foucault’s review of Andre Glucksmann’s The Master Thinkers: Michel Foucault, “La 
grande colère des faits” in Foucault, Dits et Écrits II, 1976-1988, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald 
(Paris: Quarto Gallimard, 2001), 277-281. 
53 See Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, edited by Michel 
Senellart, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 267ff. 
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By contrast, this new practice, in effect, repeatedly opens itself to the possibility that ‘God’ is 
not dead after all, to the notion that an originary will is both viable and necessary for contem-
porary thought.  By incorporating the trace of the religious or metaphysical within thought’s 
performance via this openness, Foucault produces a practice, which, if it is repeatedly con-
fronted with the real possibility of its own lack of viability, is (performatively) immanent 
‘without remainder’ insofar as it meets that test.  Rather than attempt to eliminate the theo-
logical remainder of a would-be immanent discourse, and thus to think purely immanently 
(with all of its dangers of reinscription of the transcendent or transcendental), Foucault instead 
broaches the potential necessity of that remainder to thought, so that, should an immanent 
discourse be shown to remain possible in that encounter, it is no longer circumscribed by this 
‘remainder.’  By engaging the possibility that there is a ‘beyond’ or ‘other side’ of the finite, 
immanent limit, and accepting the demand not to circumscribe concepts such as freedom in 
order to refuse such a beyond or other side, Foucault opens the way for an immanent dis-
course which would repeatedly rupture any subtle transcendentalism that it might tend to 
reinscribe.  Moreover, it remains maximally open to becoming other, by placing its own very 
possibility and limits in question.  As such, his approach does not so much resolve the earlier 
problem of a persistent theological horizon of immanent thought, but refigures the relation of 
immanence to its other, incorporating openness to it as a positive dimension of thought within 
its performance, in a manner that fundamentally defines a new relation to the limit.     
It may appear excessive to find in Foucault’s brief comments concerning originary will 
a whole redefinition of his relation to the limit.  The point, however, is that such a structure 
can be seen to be operative in Foucault’s work subsequently, in particular in relation to relig-
ion, as the dependence of thought upon religion exemplifies this ‘virtue’: his analysis of mysti-
cism as the first great form of revolt in the West, his engagement with what he termed the ‘po-
litical spirituality’ of the Iranian revolution, and his examination of the significance of early 
Christian practices of the self for both modern subjectivity and its critique. 
 
Foucault and Mysticism as Revolt 
In his comments at the end of “What is Critique?,” Foucault already links the question of the 
necessity of originary will to freedom to the question of early modern Christian mysticism as a 
form of revolt.  He acknowledges that he is “haunted” by the fact that  
 
If the matrix of this critical attitude in the Western world must be sought out in religious at-
titudes and in connection with the exercise of pastoral power in the Middle Ages, all the 
same it is surprising that mysticism is seen as an individual experience while institutional 
and political struggles are viewed as absolutely unified, and in any case, constantly referring 
to one another.  I would say that one of the first great forms of revolt in the West was mysti-
cism.54 
 
Foucault is primarily haunted, not by mysticism as such, but by the idea that a most intensely 
individual form of experience, apparently apart from the political sphere, is a profoundly po-
litical act capable of connecting and uniting people in revolt.  His analysis of mysticism thus 
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clearly bears parallels with his complex broaching of the possibility that freedom is grounded 
by an originary will not constituted, at its most basic level, by historic-political forces.  How-
ever, if Foucault is not primarily concerned in these comments with mysticism as such, the 
question arises as to how mysticism functions as a revolutionary force.  Perhaps, Foucault’s 
clearest answer comes in one of his Iranian writings, when he talks of “what we [in the West] 
have forgotten since the Renaissance and the great crisis of Christianity, a political spiritual-
ity.”55 In turn, the notion of mysticism as a political spirituality (or rather a dimension of one) 
is most clarified in Security, Territory, Population.  Here mysticism is shown to resist pastoral 
power insofar as it depends on the soul seeing itself in God rather than being examined by 
another and progresses according to personal divine revelation rather than external teaching.  
Equally, it undermines the pastorate’s usual notion of ‘progress’: mystical illumination consti-
tutes an illumination that blinds, in which knowledge becomes a kind of ignorance.56  Com-
munity is presented, by Foucault, as another form of counter-conduct against the pastorate, 
with communities often forming around the refusal of the pastorate’s external authority.57  
Although he doesn’t make the connection explicitly in his rapid survey, the direct and nega-
tive mystical experience of God sits well with the notion of a community resistant to pastoral 
power.  More precisely, mysticism can be thought of as offering, in its most intense form, the 
mode of existence of a community which does not only resist authority externally, but also 
internally to a significant extent.  The direct, individual encounter with God creates a commu-
nity of individuals, in which any form of communal authority remains secondary, however 
enlightened it might be deemed to be.  As such, mysticism is principle both of individuality 
and revolutionary community.   
In Security, Territory, Population, Foucault is explicit that modern secular forms of 
counter-conduct (such as revolution) do not have a direct relationship with their religious 
precedents at the level of ideology.  However, they bear a more complex relationship, in 
which, for instance, religious communities resistant to the pastorate directly influence utopian 
revolutionary movements, at what might be termed a formal level.58  His comments after 
“What is critique?” similarly suggest that the form of the revolutionary will, with its complex 
interplay of the individual and communal, equally owes a ‘formal’ debt to mysticism.  And, 
thus, though not that which primarily haunts him, the question hangs in the air as to the ex-
tent to which the revolutionary depends upon the mystical, as constituting a horizon of possi-
bility for thinking it.  If later revolutionary thinking does not draw directly from the ideologi-
cal content of Christian mysticism, does it nonetheless depend upon a specific political struc-
ture that, in turn, depends on Christian ideas of individual mystical experience and communal 
spirituality, which in turn are dependent upon the idea of a unifying transcendent order and 
reality? (Moreover, the force of mystical experience and communal ultimately lies in the en-
                                                 
55 Michel Foucault, “What are the Iranians Dreaming About?,” in Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, Fou-
cault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism (Chicago and London: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2005), 209. 
56 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978, edited by Michel 
Senellart, translated by Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 212-3. 
57 Ibid., 211-12. 
58 Ibid., 357. 
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counter with God.)  Or, more minimally, does revolt depend upon evoking the weight of a 
shared tradition of singular force, capable of supporting in its positive, historical density and 
imaginative power such revolutionary action?  His comment in Iran, recalling the West’s for-
gotten political spirituality, takes seriously this notion of a political spirituality, as at least mer-
iting attention—not just in its Iranian, but its Western form—thus, his  “I can already hear the 
French laughing, but I know that they are wrong.”59  The French are laughing precisely be-
cause Foucault opens his thought, if not to accepting the religious horizon of mysticism as 
such, then, at least, to the notion, that originary or transcendent structures of experience or the 
tradition which has supported them, may be necessary to revolt.   
In other words, Foucault opens his thought to that which is ‘other’ than it to the point 
of rupturing the very premises of his work heretofore, while wagering that it is possible to 
allow his thought be affected by this other, while remaining within the bounds of immanence.  
Indeed, it will only be after his long detour through Greece, Rome and the early Christian 
world that Foucault will return in his very final lecture at the Collège de France in 1984 to the 
question of mysticism.60  He does so to suggest that the critical force of early modern Christian 
mysticism, in significant part, is itself a function of the fact that the more basic critical impulse 
of parrhesia has survived within it across the Christian centuries.  Or rather, that at least a 
somewhat ambiguous Christian form of it has preserved parrhesia at the margins of Western 
subjective practice.61  As such, across several years, Foucault is able finally to bring the act of 
opening his thought to mysticism to completion, concluding that such openness need not lead 
to the affirmation of the dependence of revolution upon a religious trace.  Instead, it is possi-
ble rather to recognise in early modern Christian mysticism, as its vital force, the immanent 
resources of Greek parrhesia. 
 
Political Spirituality of the Iranian Revolution 
The embrace of an ‘other’ possibility of thought is even more pronounced in what George 
Stauth terms the “excited attention” Foucault pays to the Iranian revolution.62  And, arguably, 
the status of this ‘otherness’ is crucial to unpicking the problematic dimensions of the “politi-
cal spirituality” he discovers there.63  Foucault finds that, in the revolution, a people are en-
abled to change a regime, but more deeply to “change ourselves,” “[o]ur way of being, our 
relationships with others, with things, with eternity, with God, etc”, through a “profound 
spirituality.”  Here “subjectivity” was no mere product of power, but the principal site of re-
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sistance to it.64  It offered a notion of resistance to power not merely tactical, mobile and frag-
mented but one which “transforms a thousand forms of discontent, hatred, misery, and de-
spairs, into a force” and gives “an irreducible strength to everything, from the depth of a peo-
ple, that is capable of opposing state power,” uniting it in an “absolutely collective will.”65 
More precisely, “political spirituality,” is “a form of expression, a mode of social relations, a 
supple and widely accepted elemental organisation, a way of being together, a way of speak-
ing and listening, something that allows one to be listened to by others, and to yearn for some-
thing with them at the same time as they yearn for it.”66  It is a mode of subjectivity that makes 
the revolution possible, but is not the source of the revolution as such.  This derives from the 
ordinary people, from their “unrelenting plea to denounce injustice, to criticise the govern-
ment, to rise up against unacceptable measures”67—impulses informed by religion certainly, 
but in complex intersection with broader cultural and political traditions, as well as unfolding 
historical experience, and so irreducible to it.68  Foucault also recognises, however, that “politi-
cal spirituality” is specifically a movement giving “a permanent role in political life to the tra-
ditional structures of Islamic society.”  For him, however, these two dimensions of political 
spirituality are the “converse and inverse” of one another.  Political spirituality is a movement 
toward Islamic government and values, which incorporates “a spiritual dimension into politi-
cal life” and in which “Islamic” political programmes and goals would not be an obstacle to 
the individual as willing subject.69 
As in the case of Christian mysticism, Foucault thus finds in this political spirituality a 
form revolutionary action, which is simultaneously individual and communal—one, which is 
bound to the singularity of Islam as a religion, yet which values the individual.  As such, 
moreover, it is radically ‘other’ than the modern Western tradition of revolution—indeed, as 
has been seen, it is literally laughable to a Western audience.  The whole tenor of his writings 
is, as Stauth points out, to push both himself and his readers to treat the Iranian revolution on 
its own terms as a novel, unprecedented historical event70—to be attentive and “respectful 
when such a singularity arises.”71  He is explicitly concerned not to interpret this Islamic revo-
lution through the lens of Western categories and to avoid the prejudices of the West’s “thou-
sand-year reproach” of Islam for “fanaticism.”72  
These various concerns reflect a complex position.  To allow the Iranian revolution its 
otherness, Foucault must certainly attempt to describe it on its own terms without orientalist 
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nostalgia, reductions or dismissals.  However, he must also recognise that such a revolution is 
strictly impossible in the contemporary intellectual framework of the West—it remains a “sin-
gular” event within a different context.  His analysis is a call to engage with it as ‘other,’ as an 
impossible limit—in order to push Western thought maximally beyond itself, not to embrace it 
as a model for the West or to rediscover the notion of a religious revolution.  Foucault’s focus 
on Islamic political spirituality, as offering primarily a form of revolutionary action open to 
individual experience, suggests a recognition that, perhaps, what might have to be accepted 
from the Iranian revolution in the West is the necessity to modern revolution of a unifying 
religious spirituality, if only in the sense of dependence a singular religious tradition for the 
very concept of unitary action.    
The problem with Foucault’s analysis, arguably, is that he is too intent in ascribing 
‘otherness’ to the Iranian revolution.  He fails to recognise the extent to which the revolution 
belongs to a historical situation different from, but related to the Western context.  Thus where 
other contemporary observers could discern diverse and even divergent movements within 
the revolution, many with parallels in Western political contexts (not least Marxist and femi-
nist movements, in addition to more explicitly religiously-motivated groupings), and where 
they could anticipate the tensions and dangers of the increasing prominence of a narrative, 
which characterised the revolution as Islamic, Foucault too readily saw the people united by 
an “absolutely collective will.”73  This is not to suggest that Foucault was necessarily wrong in 
thinking that Islamic political spirituality played a significant role in uniting the people.  
Rather, as Michiel Leezenberg points out, his refusal to bring typically Western tools to bear 
on the situation, not least his own analytics of power, leaves him without critical tools to inter-
rogate the revolution and leads to conclusions at odds with the basic thrust of his earlier gene-
alogies.74  As such, Stauth concludes, Foucault’s very concern to avoid orientalism ultimately 
renders him vulnerable to it.75  
Foucault’s engagement with the Iranian revolution again follows the pattern of open-
ness to an ‘other’ possibility, impossible for his thought as such—openness, if necessary, to the 
point of rupture of its existing framework.  In this instance, however, the subtle ‘staging’ re-
quired for such a performance has gone awry, in no small part because of the complexities of 
the double otherness of the political spirituality of the revolution.  That is, Foucault recognises 
the impossibility as such of the revolution’s political spirituality for Western thought (vis-à-vis 
its rejection of the early modern conjunction of mysticism and revolt).  However, he fails to 
interrogate the impossibilities (and possibilities) of this same political spirituality within a 
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quasi-modernised Iran.  In other words, his analysis prioritises the otherness of the revolution 
for Western thought and, in the process, amplifies the otherness of the revolution, such that 
dynamic movement between his own position and its ‘other’ becomes distorted. 
 
Christianity and the Greeks 
A third moment of Foucault’s ‘virtue’ is encountered in his engagement with Christian prac-
tices of the self in the early 1980s.  James Bernauer and, more recently, Jonathan Tran have ar-
gued that Foucault was fascinated with these practices and that his ethics of the self owes 
more to Christian than to pagan practices of the self.76  Such an argument undoubtedly 
touches upon an important dimension of Foucault’s work in the period until 1981, but is diffi-
cult to square with his obvious passion for the Greek notion of the care of the self, once he had 
discovered its full significance, and the impetus this discovery gave to his work.77  Once more, 
these divergent aspects of Foucault’s evolving position can be understood to reflect a new rela-
tion to the limit.   
The late 1980 Dartmouth/Howison lectures, published in English as “About the Begin-
ning of the Hermeneutics of the Self,” broadly sum up the conclusions of Foucault’s 1980 and, 
then soon-to-be-delivered 1981 courses at the Collège de France (“On The Government of the 
Living” and “Subjectivity and Truth,” respectively),78 and offer an important window upon his 
fascination with Christian practices of the self.  Not least, they suggest a Foucault who, having 
examined early Christian practices in 1980, turns to Greek and Roman practices seeking an 
alternative, but without finding one.  Foucault does discover in the ancient Greeks and Ro-
mans a distinctive set of practices of truth-telling, centred on “the necessity of telling the truth 
about oneself, the role of the master and the master’s discourse, the long way that leads finally 
to the emergence of the self,” and a notion of the self (and its truth) less to be uncovered than 
to be constituted.  However, these practices remained bound to a notion of what he terms the 
“gnomic self,” in which “the force of the truth is one with the form of the will.”79  In other 
words, at this point Foucault accepts Pierre Hadot’s argument that Greek and Roman practices 
of the self centred on a kind of care of the self, certainly, but one defined as participation of the 
self in universal truth.80  For Foucault, this offers little by way of resources with which to ar-
ticulate a notion of subjectivity capable of critiquing and contesting the modern subject. 
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The Dartmouth/Howison lectures show Foucault returning to Christian practices of the 
self and concluding that they take over and fundamentally refigured these distinctive ele-
ments of Greek and Roman culture, but placing the emphasis upon a notion of the deep truth 
of the self, and the idea that this truth can be grasped paradoxically, only in self-sacrifice.  (The 
hermeneutics of the self is made possible, only insofar as the individual is willing to sacrifice 
the self to the exhaustive verbalisation of thought.)81  Moreover, Foucault holds that Christian-
ity not only assimilates the fundamental elements of pagan practices of the self, but that “in 
Christianity we see the development of a much more complex technology of the self,” capable 
of distinguishing between several forms of knowledge where pagan practices aim at “the 
permanent superimposition of the subject of knowledge and the subject of the will.”82  Not 
least, “knowledge of the self takes shape in the constitution of thought as a field of subjective 
data which are to be interpreted.”83  Foucault, moreover, acknowledges that this Christian 
technology of the self has been central to the Western notion of subjectivity, with modern sub-
jectivity constituted in the effort to retain the hermeneutics of the subject while replacing 
Christian self-sacrifice with a positive subject.  The lectures conclude with Foucault suggesting 
that, perhaps, the moment has come to end this search, dispensing both with the Christian 
notion of self-sacrifice, but also the hermeneutics of the self which it supports and which mod-
ern thought has sought to preserve in positive form. 
That Foucault cannot suggest how this might be done indicates that this proposal is as 
yet only a potential point of departure for his thought, and indicates that, heretofore, Foucault 
has been grappling with a different option.  Key here is his recognition that “the deep contra-
diction, or if you want, the great richness of the Christian technologies [is]: no truth about the 
self without a sacrifice of the self.”84  Together with the claim that the Christian self has been 
central to Western subjectivity, this text suggests that Foucault has broached the possibility 
that the paradoxical Christian notion of self-sacrifice as practice of the self is at the heart of the 
problem of modern subjectivity and offers the best resources to contest and undermine that 
modern notion of subjectivity.  The Christian self both inscribes a “deep contradiction” into 
Western subjectivity and may contain the rich paradox, which at least undoes the problematic 
modern solution to that contradiction.  Clearly, such a solution is not fully satisfactory, since 
the same feature of the Christian self appears as source both of the problem of and solution to 
modern subjectivity.  More importantly, however, it suggests that Foucault broaches the pos-
sibility that the Christian self, in all of its singularity (as arising out of the Christian event and 
early Christianity), constitutes the horizon of thinking about subjectivity in Western thought.  
For all of its attempted universality, Western reason, in this reading, grapples with the possi-
bilities generated and the problems posed by a singular conception of reason bequeathed to it 
by early Christianity.   
Foucault’s engagement with the early Christian self, thus, parallels his engagements 
with Christian mysticism and Islamic “political spirituality.” His search for an alternative to 
                                                 
81 Foucault, “The Hermeneutics of the Self,” 179. 
82 Ibid., 180. 
83 Ibid., 180. 
84 Ibid., 180. 
McSweeney: Religion in the Web of Immanence 
93 
 
the early Christian self in Greek and Roman practices, suggests that its conception of the self, 
does not readily accord with his work.  In his comment that the Christian technology of the 
self is the richer, there is the subtle indication that “pagan” technology of the self is, in princi-
ple, the more appealing.  The paradoxical Christian self thus constitutes an ‘other’ of his 
thought, which he allows to affect it, drawing it beyond its limits.  However, unlike the case of 
Islamic political spirituality, a tension remains, such that Foucault’s openness is a genuine, but 
reluctant one.  In other words, Bernauer and Tran are correct to suggest that Foucault’s work 
exhibits a deep engagement and even fascination with Christian practices of the self.  How-
ever, such engagement and fascination need to be located within a more complex dynamic.  
Not least, Foucault’s discovery of the ethics of care of the self as an aesthetic practice of self-
constitution ultimately demonstrates to him that it is possible to engage the challenge of think-
ing subjectivation against the modern subject, within the Western tradition, without finally 
having to depend upon a paradoxical Christian notion of self-sacrifice as care of the self.  As 
such, Foucault’s fascination with Christian thinking, at least in this respect, comes to an end 
and his thought achieves a significant thinking otherwise. 
These three instances—Foucault’s engagements with Christian mysticism, the political 
spirituality of the Iranian revolution and early Christian practices of the self—confirm the 
transformation in his relation to the limit signalled by his comments at the end of “What is 
Critique?” They reveal a practice not without its dangers or ambiguities, but which promises 
to transform the paradoxical relationship of immanence and the religion/the theological after 
the death of God, from a problem to a locus of maximal thinking otherwise. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has sought to demonstrate that Foucault’s earlier attempts to construct an imma-
nent practice occur within the shadow of the death of God and that this practice is repeatedly 
circumscribed by an indirect ‘theological’ horizon.  It has sought to argue that the indirect ‘re-
ligious question’ thus generated does not constitute so much an opening to and point of reso-
nance with the theological, but ultimately a problem for immanent discourse, which threatens 
to undermine the consistency and effectiveness of Foucault’s work and needs resolution.  In 
turn, it has argued that from the late 1970s, Foucault reframes his conception of the immanent 
relation to the limit in rather different terms.  Now rather than try to eliminate the residual, 
but problematic theological horizon that re-emerges from the effort to think immanence, he 
now builds his practice around openness to horizons of thought which would exceed and rup-
ture his framework of thought if embraced, balancing such openness with the pursuit of im-
manence.  Should his work survive this openness without rupture, an immanent practice 
emerges that has been taken to the limit, and thus involves the maximal degree possible of 
becoming other, of immanence-within-transcendence.  These horizons are not necessarily reli-
gious or theological, certainly not in any traditional sense of the term, but encounters with the 
‘other’ that is religion prove exemplary in Foucault’s later work for his refigured practice of 
immanence.   
What, then, are the implications of such a reading? Briefly, it might be suggested that 
they are two-fold.  First, such a reading complicates any notion that Foucault’s thought bears a 
resonance with theological or religious thinking, or defines the contemporary deconstructed 
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space of such discourse, or, indeed, that Foucault’s writings and theology constitute dis-
courses with their own prerogatives.  To draw upon those moments in which Foucault’s work 
is inscribed within an indirect theological horizon or opens itself variously to elements of re-
ligion as other, it is equally necessary to engage with the more fundamental problematic of 
which these moments are a part.  As such, it might be argued that the key significance of Fou-
cault’s work for religion lies in his problematisation of the reason-religion relation and the 
ethos of thinking otherwise which he elaborates.  To this extent, his work, then, suggests no 
straightforward ‘theology after Foucault’ or ‘theology in dialogue with Foucault,’ but invites 
and challenges religious thinking to engage deeply with the problematisation of discourse af-
ter the death of God.  Of course, this is not as simple or simplistic as saying that Foucault’s 
thought thereby demands immanence of religious and theological thinking.  Rather, it is a 
matter of challenging religious and theological thinking to take seriously the gap between re-
ligious and immanent discourse and to risk engaging with it as ‘other’ of its thought. 
Second, this reading of Foucault’s relation to religion foregrounds the complexity of the 
pursuit of immanent discourse after the death of God.  Of course, Foucault’s is one response to 
this complexity, but it does highlight—to borrow Derrida’s terms—that religion does return 
repeatedly as a question, potential limit, and thus a problem, for philosophical discourse after 
the death of God; that an immanent discourse remains within the long shadow of the death of 
God and that the question of immanent discourse needs to remain a problematised one. Such a 
reading thus poses important questions to recent continental philosophy (e.g. Badiou, Žižek 
and Agamben), which increasingly turns—via materialist readings of religion—to the re-
sources of thinkers such as St. Paul and to notions such as messianicity and a politics of love.85  
Foucault affirms that thought must grapple with such figures and concepts, but equally cau-
tions that the assumption that philosophy can engage religion entirely beyond the death of 
God may well lead to subtle re-inscriptions of problematic theological horizons of thought. 
Finally, this reading clarifies an aspect of Foucault’s practice, bringing to light some-
thing of the risks and dangers demanded by thinking otherwise and of the courage necessary 
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